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Abstract
This paper introduces an abductive framework for updating knowledge bases represented
by extended disjunctive programs. We first provide a simple transformation from abductive
programs to update programs which are logic programs specifying changes on abductive
hypotheses. Then, extended abduction, which was introduced by the same authors as a gen-
eralization of traditional abduction, is computed by the answer sets of update programs.
Next, different types of updates, view updates and theory updates are characterized by ab-
ductive programs and computed by update programs. The task of consistency restoration
is also realized as special cases of these updates. Each update problem is comparatively
assessed from the computational complexity viewpoint. The result of this paper provides
a uniform framework for different types of knowledge base updates, and each update is
computed using existing procedures of logic programming.
KEYWORDS: extended disjunctive program, extended abduction, view update, theory
update, consistency restoration.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Knowledge base updates
When new information arrives at a knowledge base, an intelligent agent adjusts its
current knowledge or belief to conform to the new circumstances. The problem of
∗ This paper is a revised and extended version of (Sakama and Inoue, 1999).
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knowledge base updates is then how to specify the desired change in a knowledge
base and to compute it automatically. The issue has been extensively studied in
the context of databases and artificial intelligence (AI) and several different types
of updates are studied in the literature. Among others, the following three cases
are typical problem settings in database and knowledge base updating. The first
case considers a knowledge base which contains two different kinds of knowledge,
variable knowledge and invariable knowledge. In this case, updates are permitted
only on the variable knowledge. Updates on the invariable part are then translated
into updates on the variable part. An example of this type of updates is a view
update in deductive databases, e.g., (Decker, 1990; Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a;
Guessoum and Lloyd, 1990; Teniente and Olive, 1995). A deductive database con-
sists of invariable derivation rules (called an intensional database) and variable base
facts (called an extensional database). Then, the view update problem in deductive
databases is concerned with the problem of translating an update request on the
derived facts into updates on the base facts. (For updating deductive databases, an
excellent survey is in (Decker, 1998).)
In the second case, on the other hand, there is no distinction between variable and
invariable knowledge, and the whole knowledge base is subject to change. In this
case, an update is done by directly introducing new information to a knowledge base.
When there are conflicts between the current knowledge and the new knowledge, a
higher priority is put on the new one to produce a consistent theory as a whole. This
type of updates frequently appears in AI in the context of theory updates or belief
updates, e.g., (Fagin et al., 1983; Winslett, 1990; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991).
On the other hand, a knowledge base happens to be inconsistent in the face of
contradictory knowledge. The third case handles consistency restoration in such
knowledge bases. There are different sources which may cause inconsistency, e.g.,
conflicting information, violation of integrity constraints, etc. In this case, a knowl-
edge base must be updated to restore consistency by detecting the source of incon-
sistency and repairing it. The problems of integrity maintenance in databases, e.g.,
(Teniente and Olive, 1995; Decker, 1996), and inconsistency removal in knowledge
bases, e.g., (Pereira et al., 1991; Inoue, 1994), are of this kind.
These three types of updates are not necessarily independent and orthogonal. In
fact, integrity maintenance is often done as a subtask of a view update to remove
contradiction derived by integrity constraints, and inconsistency removal is charac-
terized as a special case of theory update which changes an inconsistent program
to a consistent one. On the other hand, view updates and theory updates have
been relatively independently studied so far and little connection exists between
them. When a knowledge base is represented by a logic program, view updates are
the problem of updating derived facts from a program, while theory updates are
the problem of updating rules/facts included in a program. Thus, view updates
and theory updates have seemingly different problem settings and goals. In fact,
there are many studies which deal with updates in logic programming and deduc-
tive databases, while many of them are individual techniques to realize either view
updates or theory updates. As far as the authors know, no study formalizes these
two update problems in a single uniform framework.
An abductive framework for computing knowledge base updates 3
1.2 Extended abduction
Abduction is a form of hypothetical reasoning in AI. A traditional logical framework
of abduction (Poole, 1988; Kakas et al., 1998) defines an explanation of a given
observation as a set of hypotheses which, together with the background theory,
logically entails the observation. More precisely, given a first-order theory K and
an observation G, traditional abduction computes a set E of hypotheses satisfying
K ∪ E |= G
where K ∪E is consistent.
When a background knowledge base K is nonmonotonic, however, the above
framework of abduction is not sufficiently expressive. For example, consider the
knowledge base written in a normal logic program:
K : flies(x)← bird(x), not ab(x),
ab(x)← broken-wing(x),
bird(tweety)← ,
bird(opus)← ,
broken-wing(tweety)← ,
where not represents negation as failure. If we observe that tweety flies, there is a
good reason to assume that the wound has already healed. Then, removing the fact
broken-wing(tweety) from the program explains the observation flies(tweety). On
the other hand, suppose that we later notice that opus does not fly anymore. Since
flies(opus) is entailed by K, we now have to revise the knowledge base to block
the derivation of flies(opus) by assuming, for instance, broken-wing(opus).
Traditional abduction has difficulty to cope with these situations. First, abduc-
tion computes facts which are to be introduced to a program to explain an obser-
vation. However, abduction cannot compute facts which are to be removed from a
program to explain an observation. Second, abduction computes explanations ac-
counting for an observation, while it cannot compute hypotheses to unexplain a
phenomenon that does not hold anymore. To cope with the first problem, Inoue
and Sakama (1995) introduce the notion of “negative explanations”. Given a back-
ground knowledge base K and an observation G, a set F of hypotheses is called a
negative explanation of G if
K \ F |= G
where K \ F is consistent. An explanation E satisfying K ∪ E |= G is then called
a positive explanation. On the other hand, the notion of “anti-explanations” is
introduced to characterize the second situation. Given a background knowledge
base K and an observation G, a set E of hypotheses is called a (positive) anti-
explanation of G if
K ∪ E 6|= G,
and a set F of hypotheses is called a negative anti-explanation of G if
K \ F 6|= G.
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These extensions of traditional abduction are called extended abduction (Inoue and Sakama, 1995).
Extended abduction is particularly useful when a knowledge base is nonmono-
tonic. In nonmonotonic theories, deletion of formulas may introduce new formu-
las. Thus, positive and negative explanations play a complementary role in ac-
counting for an observation in nonmonotonic theories. On the other hand, anti-
explanations are useful to account for negative observations which do not hold. In
this respect, traditional abduction is concerned with explaining positive observa-
tions only. Negative observations are often perceived in real-life situations, and are
analogous to the concept of negative examples in inductive concept-learning. Thus,
anti-explanations play a dual role to explanations. Moreover, extended abduction
not only enhances reasoning ability of traditional abduction, but has useful appli-
cations for nonmonotonic theory change (Inoue and Sakama, 1995), system repair
problems (Buccafurri et al., 1997), and incremental evolution of (inconsistent) re-
quirement specifications (Nuseibeh and Russo, 1999).
1.3 The purpose of this paper
The purposes of this paper are twofold. Our first goal is to provide a method of
computing extended abduction. Many procedures exist for (traditional) abduction,
while few is known for extended abduction with the exception of (Inoue and Sakama, 1999).
Inoue and Sakama (1999) provide a computational method for extended abduction
in a restricted class of normal logic program. By contrast, this paper considers
extended abduction in extended disjunctive programs (EDPs) which are a fairly
general class of logic programming. To compute extended abduction, this paper in-
troduces an update program which is a logic program obtained by a simple program
transformation. An update program specifies changes on abductive hypotheses, and
(minimal) (anti-)explanations are computed by the (U-minimal) answer sets of an
update program.
Our second goal is to characterize various types of knowledge base updates
through extended abduction. It is well known that knowledge base updates are
related to abduction problems, and there are several studies which realize updates
through abduction. However, due to the nature of traditional abduction, existing
studies often adopt somewhat indirect formulations for representing hypotheses re-
moval or view deletion (see Section 7.2 for detailed discussion). In this paper we use
extended abduction and formalize different types of update problems such as view
updates, theory updates, and consistency restoration. These updates are then com-
puted using update programs. We assess computational complexities and compare
the difficulty of each update problem.
This paper is a revised and extended version of (Sakama and Inoue, 1999). In
the previous paper we considered knowledge base updates in extended logic pro-
grams. In the present paper, we extend the techniques to extended disjunctive pro-
grams (EDPs) which possibly contain disjunction in a program. EDPs are strictly
more expressive than extended (or normal) logic programs without disjunction,
and are useful to express many practical problems in the complexity class ΣP2
(Eiter et al., 1997). In the context of updating data/knowledge bases, there are
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few studies which handle updating disjunctive (deductive) databases. The present
paper is thus intended to provide a framework for (extended) abduction and up-
date, which is applicable to a broader class of logic programming and deductive
databases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a theoretical
framework used in this paper. Section 3 introduces the notion of update programs
and a method of computing extended abduction. Section 4 and Section 5 respec-
tively characterize view updates and theory updates through extended abduction,
and provide their computational methods by update programs. Consistency restora-
tion is also characterized as a special case of each update. Section 6 analyzes com-
putational complexities of various update problems. Section 7 presents detailed
comparisons with related work, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Extended disjunctive programs
In this paper we consider knowledge bases represented as extended disjunctive pro-
grams (EDPs).
An EDP is a set of rules of the form:
L1; · · · ;Ll ← Ll+1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln (n ≥ m ≥ l ≥ 0) (†)
where each Li is a literal, “;” represents “or”, and not represents negation as failure
(NAF). notL is also called an NAF-literal. The part left of ← is the head and the
part right of ← is the body of the rule. We often use the Greek letter Σ (resp. Γ)
to represent the disjunction (resp. conjunction) in the head (resp. body). Σ or Γ is
identified with the set of (NAF-)literals included in it. A rule is disjunctive if its
head contains more than one literal. The head is possibly empty and a rule with
the empty head is called an integrity constraint. A disjunctive rule with the empty
body is called a disjunctive fact. A disjunctive fact L1; · · · ;Ll ← is simply written as
L1; · · · ;Ll. In particular, the non-disjunctive fact L← is identified with the literal
L and is simply called a fact. An EDP is called an extended logic program (ELP) if
l ≤ 1 for each rule (†); and a normal disjunctive program (NDP) if every Li is an
atom. An NDP is called a normal logic program (NLP) if l ≤ 1 for each rule (†).
In this paper, a program means an EDP unless stated otherwise. A program (rule,
(NAF-)literal) is ground if it contains no variable. A program P is semantically
identified with its ground instantiation, i.e., the set of all ground rules obtained
from P by substituting variables in P by elements of its Herbrand universe in every
possible way. Thus, a program containing variables is considered as a shorthand of
its ground instantiation.
The semantics of EDPs is given by the answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991).
Let LP be the set of all ground literals in the language of a program P . A set
S(⊆ LP ) satisfies the ground rule of the form (†) if {Ll+1, . . . , Lm} ⊆ S and
{Lm+1, . . . , Ln } ∩ S = ∅ imply Li ∈ S for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ l). In particular, S
satisfies the ground integrity constraint ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln if
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{L1, . . . , Lm} 6⊆ S or {Lm+1, . . . , Ln } ∩ S 6= ∅. Let P be a not-free EDP (i.e.,
m = n for each rule of (†)). Then, a set S(⊆ LP ) is an answer set of P if S is a
minimal set such that
1. S satisfies every ground rule from the ground instantiation of P ,
2. If S contains a pair of complementary literals L and ¬L, then S = LP .
Next, let P be any EDP and S ⊆ LP . Then, the not-free EDP PS is defined
as follows: for every ground rule (†) from the ground instantiation of P , the rule
L1; · · · ;Ll ← Ll+1, . . . , Lm is in P
S if {Lm+1, . . . , Ln}∩S = ∅. Then, S is an answer
set of P if S is an answer set of PS . An EDP has none, one, or multiple answer sets
in general. Answer sets coincide with stable models (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988)
when P is an NDP or an NLP.
An answer set is consistent if it is not LP . A program P is consistent if it has a
consistent answer set; otherwise P is inconsistent. If a rule R is satisfied in every
answer set of P , it is written as P |= R. In particular, P |= L if a literal L is
included in every answer set of P . When P is inconsistent, we write P |= ⊥ where
⊥ is the reserved proposition in LP .
2.2 Abductive programs
The abductive framework considered in this paper is based on extended abduction
introduced by Inoue and Sakama (1995).
An abductive program is a pair 〈P,A〉 where P and A are EDPs. Every element
in A is called an abducible. An abducible A ∈ A is also called an abducible rule
(resp. abducible fact) if A is a rule (resp. a fact). An abducible containing vari-
ables is considered as a shorthand of its ground instantiation. So any instance A of
an element from A is also an abducible and is written as A ∈ A. Abducibles are
hypothetical rules which are used to account for an observation together with the
background knowledge P . Similar frameworks are also introduced in (Inoue, 1994;
Inoue and Sakama, 1998). An abductive program 〈P,A〉 is consistent if P is con-
sistent. Without loss of generality, we assume that for any rule Σ ← Γ from P ,
Σ∩A 6= ∅ implies both Σ ⊆ A and Γ = ∅.1 If there is a rule Σ← Γ with Σ∩A 6= ∅
such that Σ 6⊆ A or Γ 6= ∅, then any A ∈ Σ ∩ A is made a non-abducible by intro-
ducing a rule A ← A′ with a new abducible A′ and replacing A with A′ in every
(disjunctive) fact consisting abducibles only.
We also assume that for any disjunctive fact Σ← from P , Σ ⊆ A implies Σ ∈ A.
That is, if a program contains a disjunctive fact Σ which consists of abducibles,
Σ itself is included in A as an abducible. This condition is natural, since any
disjunctive fact in P which consists of abducibles is considered a hypothesis. On
the other hand, any disjunctive fact which is not included in P is freely specified
in A as a possible hypothesis.
1 We pose this assumption just by technical reasons. A similar assumption is assumed, for instance,
in (Kakas et al., 1998).
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Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program andG a ground literal representing a positive
observation. A pair (E,F ) is a skeptical explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉 if
1. (P \ F ) ∪ E |= G,
2. (P \ F ) ∪ E is consistent,
3. E ⊆ A \ P and F ⊆ A ∩ P .
If the first condition is replaced by “G is true in some answer set of (P \ F ) ∪ E”,
(E,F ) is called a credulous explanation. Any skeptical explanation is a credulous
explanation. On the other hand, given a ground literal G representing a negative
observation, a pair (E,F ) is a credulous anti-explanation of G with respect to
〈P,A〉 if
1. (P \ F ) ∪ E 6|= G,
2. (P \ F ) ∪ E is consistent,
3. E ⊆ A \ P and F ⊆ A ∩ P .
If the first condition is replaced by “G is true in no answer set of (P \F )∪E”, (E,F )
is called a skeptical anti-explanation. Any skeptical anti-explanation is a credulous
anti-explanation. In particular, when G = ⊥, the first and the second conditions are
identical. In this case, the credulous anti-explanation (E,F ) of ⊥ is a hypothesis
which turns a (possibly inconsistent) P to a consistent program (P \ F ) ∪ E.
Throughout the paper, a skeptical/credulous (anti-)explanation is simply called
an (anti-)explanation when such a distinction is not important. A positive or neg-
ative observation is also simply called an observation when no confusion arises.
Without loss of generality, an observation is assumed to be a (non-abducible)
ground literal (Inoue and Sakama, 1996). By the third condition, the introduced
hypotheses E are abducibles which are not included in the program P , while the
removed hypotheses F are abducibles which are included in P . Thus, it holds that
E ∩ F = ∅ for any (anti-)explanation (E,F ). Among (anti-)explanations, minimal
(anti-)explanations are of particular interest. An (anti-)explanation (E,F ) of an
observation G is called minimal if for any (anti-)explanation (E′, F ′) of G, E′ ⊆ E
and F ′ ⊆ F imply E′ = E and F ′ = F .
Note that the abduction problem considered here is different from the usual
one based on traditional normal abduction (Kakas et al., 1998).2 That is, given
an abductive program 〈P,A〉, normal abduction computes a skeptical explanation
(resp. credulous explanation) E of a positive observation G satisfying
1. P ∪ E |= G (resp. G is true in some answer set of P ∪ E),
2. P ∪ E is consistent,
3. E ⊆ A \ P .
Compared with normal abduction, extended abduction abduces hypotheses which
are not only introduced to a program but also removed from a program to explain
2 To distinguish extended abduction from traditional one, we call traditional abduction normal
abduction, hereafter.
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observations. Moreover, anti-explanations are used to unexplain a negative obser-
vation which is not true. With this respect, normal abduction is considered as a
special case of extended abduction where only hypotheses introduction is considered
for explaining positive observations.
In an abductive program 〈P,A〉, P and A are semantically identified with their
ground instantiations, so that set operations over them are defined on the ground
instances. Thus, when (E,F ) contains variables, (P \ F ) ∪ E means that deleting
every instance of F from P and adding any instance of E to P . Also, when E
contains variables, the set inclusion E′ ⊆ E is defined for any instance E′ of E.
Generally, given sets S and T of literals/rules containing variables, any set operation
◦ is defined as S ◦T = inst(S)◦inst(T ) where inst(S) is the ground instantiation of
S (Inoue, 2000). For example, when p(x) ∈ T , for any constant “a” in the language
of T , it holds that {p(a)} ⊆ T , {p(a)}\T = ∅, and T \{p(a)} = (T \{p(x)})∪ { p(y) |
y 6= a}, and so on. Also, any literal/rule in a set is identified with its variant modulo
variable renaming.
Example 2.1
Let 〈P,A〉 be the abductive program such that
P : g ← p(x), not r
r ← q(a),
q(a)←, q(b)← .
A : p(x), q(x).
Then, ({p(x)}, {q(x)}) is a skeptical explanation of g, while ({p(a)}, {q(a)}) and
({p(b)}, {q(a)}) are the minimal skeptical explanations of g.
Suppose an abductive program 〈P,A〉 where A contains rules or disjunctive
facts. In this case, 〈P,A〉 is transformed to a semantically equivalent abductive
program in which abducibles contain only (non-disjunctive) facts as follows. Given
an abductive program 〈P,A〉, let
R = {Σ← Γ | (Σ← Γ) ∈ A and Σ← Γ is not a non-disjunctive fact } .
Then, we define
P n = (P \ R) ∪ {Σ← Γ, γR | R = (Σ← Γ) ∈ R}
∪ { γR ←| R ∈ R ∩ P },
An = (A \R) ∪ { γR | R ∈ R},
where γR is a newly introduced atom (called the name of R) uniquely associated
with each rule R in R. For any rule R ∈ R, we refer to its name using the function
n(R) = γR. In particular, we define that any abducible fact L← has the name L,
i.e., n(L) = L. We call 〈P n,An 〉 the normal form of 〈P,A〉. With this setting, for
any observation G there is a 1-1 correspondence between (anti-)explanations with
respect to 〈P,A〉 and those with respect to 〈P n,An 〉. In what follows, n(E) =
{n(R) | R ∈ E }.
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Proposition 2.1 (normal form transformation)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program and 〈P n,An 〉 its normal form. Then, an obser-
vationG has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical (anti-)explanation (E,F ) with respect
to 〈P,A〉 iff G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical (anti-)explanation (n(E), n(F ))
with respect to 〈P n,An 〉.
Proof
By the definition of 〈P n,An 〉, G is included in a consistent answer set of (P \F ) ∪E
iff G is included in a consistent answer set of (P n\n(F ))∪ n(E) with n(E) ⊆ An\P n
and n(F ) ⊆ An ∩ P n. Hence, the result holds.
Example 2.2
Let 〈P,A〉 be the abductive program such that
P : flies(x)← bird(x),
bird(x)← penguin(x),
bird(polly)←,
penguin(tweety)← .
A : flies(x)← bird(x),
¬flies(x)← penguin(x).
Then, the positive observation G = ¬flies(tweety) has the minimal skeptical
explanation (E,F ) = ({¬flies(tweety) ← penguin(tweety) }, { flies(tweety) ←
bird(tweety) }).
On the other hand, the abductive program 〈P,A〉 is transformed to the normal
form 〈P n,An 〉 where
P n : flies(x)← bird(x), γ1(x),
bird(x)← penguin(x),
¬flies(x)← penguin(x), γ2(x),
γ1(x)←, bird(polly)←,
penguin(tweety)←,
An : γ1(x), γ2(x).
Here, γ1(x) and γ2(x) are the names of the rules flies(x)← bird(x) and ¬flies(x)←
penguin(x), respectively. In this program, G = ¬flies(tweety) has the minimal
skeptical explanation ({ γ2(tweety) }, { γ1(tweety) }), which corresponds to the min-
imal explanation (E,F ) presented above.
Note that (E′, F ′) = ({¬flies(x)← penguin(x) }, { flies(x)← bird(x) }) is also
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an explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉, but it is not minimal (cf. Example 2.1).
In fact, E ⊆ E′ and F ⊆ F ′.
By the definition of abductive programs, a program includes no disjunctive rule
which contains both abducibles and non-abducibles in its head. Thus, if there is a
disjunctive fact Σ ← in P , every disjunct in Σ is an abducible. This justifies the
replacement of the disjunction Σ with a new abducible γ in the normal form.
Example 2.3
Let 〈P,A〉 be the abductive program such that
P : p← a ,
p← b ,
a ; b← .
A : a, b, (a ; b).
Transform 〈P,A〉 to 〈P n,An 〉 with
P n : p← a ,
p← b ,
a ; b← γ ,
γ ← .
An : a, b, γ.
Then, the negative observation p has the skeptical anti-explanation (∅, {γ}) with
respect to 〈P n,An 〉, which corresponds to the anti-explanation (∅, {a; b}) with
respect to 〈P,A〉.
Using the transformation, any abductive program having abducible rules is re-
duced to an abductive program having only (non-disjunctive) abducible facts. Thus,
in the next section we consider an abductive program 〈P,A〉 where A contains only
(non-disjunctive) facts, unless specified otherwise.3
3 Extended abduction through update programs
In this section we introduce the notion of update programs and characterize ex-
tended abduction through them.
3 By contrast, (Inoue and Sakama, 2002) introduces a method of directly computing (anti-
)explanations which are disjunctions of abducibles.
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3.1 Update programs
Suppose an abductive program 〈P,A〉 where A consists of abducible facts. Then,
update rules/programs are defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (update rules)
Given an abductive program 〈P,A〉, the set UR of update rules is defined as follows.
1. For any literal a ∈ A, the following rules are in UR:
a← not a,
a← not a,
where a is a newly introduced atom uniquely associated with a. For notational
convenience, the above pair of rules is expressed as abd(a), hereafter.
2. For any literal a ∈ A \ P , the following rule is in UR:
+a← a .
3. For any literal a ∈ A ∩ P , the following rule is in UR:
−a← not a .
Here, +a and −a are atoms which are uniquely associated with any a ∈ A. These
are called update atoms.
By the definition, the atom a becomes true iff a is not true. The pair of rules
in abd(a) then specify the situation that an abducible a is true or not. Similar
transformations are introduced in (Satoh and Iwayama, 1991; Inoue, 1994) in the
context of transforming abductive programs to normal logic programs. The pair of
rules in abd(a) is also represented by the semantically equivalent disjunctive fact
a; a← .
This replacement is useful to avoid introducing unstratified negation in abd(a) when
the original program P is stratified.
In the second condition, when p(x) ∈ A, p(a) ∈ P and p(t) 6∈ P for t 6= a, the
rule precisely becomes +p(t)← p(t) for any t 6= a. In such a case, the rule is shortly
written as +p(x) ← p(x), x 6= a. Generally, the rule becomes +p(x) ← p(x), x 6=
t1, . . . , x 6= tn for n such instances. The rule +a ← a derives the atom +a if an
abducible a which is not in P is to be true. In contrast, the rule −a← not a derives
the atom −a if an abducible a which is in P is not to be true. Thus, update atoms
represent the change of truth values of abducibles in a program, i.e., +a means the
introduction of a, while −a means the deletion of a. When an abducible a contains
variables, the associated update atom +a or −a is supposed to have exactly the
same variables. In this case, an update atom is semantically identified with its
ground instances. The set of all update atoms associated with the abducibles in A
is denoted by UA. We define that UA = UA+ ∪ UA−, where UA+ (resp. UA−) is
the set of update atoms of the form +a (resp. −a).
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Definition 3.2 (update programs)
Given an abductive program 〈P,A〉, its update program UP is defined as an EDP
such that
UP = (P \ A) ∪ UR .
UP becomes an ELP when P is an ELP.
Definition 3.3 (U-minimal answer sets)
An answer set S of UP is called U-minimal if there is no answer set T of UP such
that T ∩ UA ⊂ S ∩ UA.
By the definition, U-minimal answer sets exist whenever UP has answer sets. A U-
minimal answer set is used for characterizing a minimal change in P . In particular,
when there is no observation, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the U-minimal
answer sets of UP and the consistent answer sets of P .
Proposition 3.1 (U-minimal answer sets vs. answer sets)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program and UP its update program. Then, P has a
consistent answer set T iff UP has a U-minimal answer set S such that S∩UA = ∅
and S ∩ LP = T .
Proof
Let T be a consistent answer set of P . Put S = T ∪ { a | a ∈ A \ P }, then
S ∩ LP = T . By the definition of abductive programs, any abducible a ∈ A \ P
does not appear in the head of any rule which is not a fact in P . So T contains
no abducible a such that a ∈ A \ P , then a ∈ S implies a 6∈ S. Next, consider
UPS = (P \ A)S ∪ URS . It holds that (P \ A)S = (P \ A)T = PT \ A. For
any abd(a) ∈ UR, (a ←) ∈ URS iff a 6∈ S iff a ∈ A ∩ P ; and (a ←) ∈ URS
iff a 6∈ S iff a ∈ A \ P . Also, any +a ← a in UR is also in URS. Since T is
an answer set of P , by the construction of S it contains every abducible a such
that a ∈ A ∩ P . Thus, any −a ← not a in UR is not included in URS . Hence,
UPS = (P \ A)S ∪ URS = (PT \ A) ∪ { a ←| a ∈ A ∩ P } ∪ { a ←| a ∈
A\P } ∪ {+a← a | a ∈ A\P } = PT ∪ { a←| a ∈ S } ∪ {+a← a | a ∈ A\P }.
As T is an answer set of PT and a 6∈ S, S becomes an answer set of UPS. Thus, S
is an answer set of UP . Since S ∩ UA = ∅, S is also U-minimal.
Conversely, let S be a U-minimal answer set of UP such that S ∩ UA = ∅. By
S ∩ UA = ∅, S contains no literal in A \ P . Hence, S is a consistent answer set.
Also, it implies a ∈ S ∩ A iff a ∈ A ∩ P iff a ∈ A ∩ UPS . Put T = S ∩ LP . Then,
PT = {Σ← Γ | (Σ← Γ) ∈ UPS and Σ ⊆ LP }. Since S is a consistent answer set
of UPS , T becomes a consistent answer set of PT . Hence, T is a consistent answer
set of P .
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Example 3.1
Let 〈P,A〉 be the abductive program such that
P : p← b ,
q ← a, not b ,
a← .
A : a, b .
Then, UP becomes
UP : p← b ,
q ← a, not b ,
abd(a), abd(b) ,
−a← not a ,
+b← b .
Here, UP has four answer sets: S1 = { a, b,+b, p }, S2 = { a, b,−a,+b, p }, S3 =
{ a, b, q }, and S4 = { a, b,−a }. Of these, S3 is the U-minimal answer set and S3∩LP
coincides with the answer set of P .
3.2 Computing (anti-)explanations through UP
Next, we provide a method of computing (anti-)explanations through update pro-
grams. A positive observation G represents an evidence which is to be true in a
program. The situation is specified by the integrity constraint
← notG ,
which represents that “G should be true”. By contrast, a negative observation
G represents an evidence which is not to be true in a program. The situation is
specified by the integrity constraint
← G ,
which represents that “G must not be true”.
For instance, to explain the positive observation p in the program P of Exam-
ple 3.1, consider the program UP ∪ {← not p }. It has two answer sets: S1 and S2,
of which S1 is the U-minimal answer set. Observe that the positive observation p
has the unique minimal (skeptical) explanation ({b}, ∅) with respect to 〈P,A〉. The
situation is expressed by the update atom +b in S1. On the other hand, to unexplain
the negative observation q in P , consider the program UP ∪ {← q }. It has three an-
swer sets: S1, S2, and S4, of which S1 and S4 are the U-minimal answer sets. Here,
the negative observation q has two minimal (skeptical) anti-explanations ({b}, ∅)
and (∅, {a}) with respect to 〈P,A〉. The situations are respectively expressed by
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the update atom +b in S1 and −a in S4. Note that when the positive observation p
and the negative observation q are given at the same time, S1 becomes the unique
U-minimal answer set of UP ∪ {← not p } ∪ {← q }.4
These examples illustrate that the U-minimal answer sets are used to compute
minimal (anti-)explanations of extended abduction. Note that the constraint ←
notG extracts answer sets in which G is true, but this does not imply that G is
true in every answer set of (P \F )∪E. To know that (E,F ) is a skeptical explanation
of G, we need an additional test for checking the entailment of G from (P \F )∪E.
Proposition 3.2 (credulous vs. skeptical explanations)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program and G a positive observation. Suppose that
(E,F ) is a credulous explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉. Then, (E,F ) is a
skeptical explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉 iff (P \ F ) ∪ E ∪ {← G } is
inconsistent.
Proof
When (E,F ) is a credulous explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉, (P \F )∪E has
a consistent answer set in which G is true. Then, (E,F ) is a skeptical explanation
of G with respect to 〈P,A〉
iff (P \ F ) ∪ E has no consistent answer set in which G is not true
iff (P \ F ) ∪ E ∪ {← G } is inconsistent.
Example 3.2
Let 〈P,A〉 be the abductive program such that
P : p ; q ← a ,
¬q ← not b ,
b← .
A : a, b .
Given the positive observation G = p, (E,F ) = ({a}, {b}), ({a}, ∅) are two cred-
ulous explanations. Among them, ({a}, {b}) is also the skeptical explanation of G
where (P \ {b}) ∪ {a} ∪ {← p } is inconsistent.
In what follows, given sets E ⊆ A and F ⊆ A, we define E+ = {+a | a ∈ E } and
F− = {−a | a ∈ F }. Conversely, given sets E+ ⊆ UA+ and F− ⊆ UA−, we define
E = { a | +a ∈ E+ } and F = { a | −a ∈ F− }. Then, (minimal) credulous/skeptical
explanations are computed by update programs as follows.
Theorem 3.3 (computing credulous explanations through UP)
4 When there are positive observations p1, . . . , pm and negative observations q1, . . . , qn, instead
of considering the (m+ n)-goals ← not pi and ← qj , the same effect is achieved by introducing
the rule g ← p1, . . . , pm, not q1, . . . , not qn to UP and considering the single goal ← not g.
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Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program, UP its update program, and G a positive
observation.
1. The pair (E,F ) is a credulous explanation of G iff UP ∪ {← notG } has a
consistent answer set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩ UA−.
2. The pair (E,F ) is a minimal credulous explanation of G iff UP ∪{← notG }
has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+ and
F− = S ∩ UA−.
Proof
1. Let S be a consistent answer set of UP ∪ {← notG } such that E+ = S ∩ UA+
and F− = S ∩ UA−. For each +a ∈ E+ and −b ∈ F−, a ∈ S and b 6∈ S hold
respectively. Then, a ← and b ← are respectively produced by abd(a) and abd(b)
in UPS , so that (a ←) ∈ UPS and (b ←) 6∈ UPS . By the definition, +a ∈ E+
implies a ∈ E and −b ∈ F− implies b ∈ F , so UPS contains a rule Σ ← Γ with
Σ ⊆ LP iff ((P \ F ) ∪ E)S has the same rule. Put T = S ∩ LP . As G ∈ S, T
is a consistent answer set of (P \ F ) ∪ E in which G is true. Since E ⊆ A \ P
and F ⊆ A ∩ P , (E,F ) is a credulous explanation of G. Conversely, suppose that
(E,F ) is a credulous explanation of G. Then, there is a consistent answer set T of
(P \F )∪E in which G is true. By the definition of abductive programs, abducibles
are assumed to appear in the head of no (non-factual) rule in P . Thus, a ∈ E and
b ∈ F imply a ∈ T and b 6∈ T , respectively. In this case, UPT contains facts a ←
and b ← which are respectively produced by abd(a) and abd(b). This implies that
UPT contains a rule Σ← Γ with Σ ⊆ LP iff ((P \F )∪E)T has the same rule. Put
S = T ∪ {+a | a ∈ E } ∪ {−b, b | b ∈ F }. Then, S is a consistent answer set of
UP ∪ {← notG }, and E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩ UA−.
2. Suppose that S is a consistent U-minimal answer set of UP ∪ {← notG }
such that E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩UA−. If the credulous explanation (E,F )
of G is not minimal, there is a pair (E′, F ′) such that (E′ ⊂ E and F ′ ⊆ F )
or (E′ ⊆ E and F ′ ⊂ F ), and (P \ F ′) ∪ E′ has a consistent answer set T ′ in
which G is true. Then, there is an answer set S′ of UP ∪ {← notG } such that
T ′ = S′ ∩ LP and E′
+
= S′ ∩ UA+ and F ′− = S′ ∩ UA− by the only-if part of 1.
By E′ ∪ F ′ ⊂ E ∪ F , E′+ ∪ F ′− ⊂ E+ ∪ F− holds. Thus, S′ ∩ UA ⊂ S ∩ UA.
This contradicts the assumption that S is U-minimal. Conversely, when (E,F ) is
a minimal credulous explanation of G, UP ∪ {← notG } has a consistent answer
set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩ UA− (by 1). Suppose that S is not
U-minimal. Then, UP ∪{← notG } has a consistent U-minimal answer set S′ such
that S′ ∩UA ⊂ S ∩UA, E′+ = S′ ∩UA+, and F ′− = S′ ∩UA−. In this case, there
is a minimal credulous explanation (E′, F ′) of G such that E′ ∪ F ′ ⊂ E ∪ F by
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the if-part of 2. This contradicts the fact that (E,F ) is minimal. Hence, the result
holds.
Theorem 3.4 (computing skeptical explanations by UP)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program, UP its update program, and G a positive
observation. Then, G has a skeptical explanation (E,F ) iff UP ∪ {← notG }
has a consistent answer set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+, F− = S ∩ UA−, and
(P \ F ) ∪ E ∪ {← G } is inconsistent. In particular, (E,F ) is a minimal skeptical
explanation iff S is U-minimal among those satisfying the above condition.
Proof
Suppose that S is a consistent answer set of UP ∪ {← notG } satisfying the
condition that E+ = S ∩ UA+, F− = S ∩ UA−, and (P \ F ) ∪ E ∪ {← G } is
inconsistent. Then, (E,F ) is a credulous explanation of G (Theorem 3.3), and also a
skeptical explanation of G (Proposition 3.2). In particular, if S is U-minimal among
those satisfying the condition, (E,F ) becomes a minimal skeptical explanation by
Theorem 3.3.
Conversely, suppose that (E,F ) is a skeptical explanation of G. By Proposi-
tion 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, there is a consistent answer set S of UP ∪ {← notG }
such that E+ = S ∩ UA+, F− = S ∩ UA−, and (P \ F ) ∪E ∪ {← G } is inconsis-
tent. Suppose that (E,F ) is a minimal skeptical explanation of G. To see that S is
U-minimal among those satisfying the condition, suppose that there is an answer
set S′ which satisfies the condition and S′ ∩ UA ⊂ S ∩ UA. Put E′+ = S′ ∩ UA+
and F ′
−
= S′ ∩ UA−. Then, E′+ ∪ F ′− ⊂ E+ ∪ F−, thereby E′ ∪ F ′ ⊂ E ∪ F . As
(E′, F ′) is a skeptical explanation of G by Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, this
contradicts the assumption that (E,F ) is minimal.
Example 3.3
For the abductive program of Example 3.2, UP becomes
UP : p ; q ← a ,
¬q ← not b ,
abd(a), abd(b),
+a← a ,
−b← not b .
For the positive observation p, the program UP ∪ {← not p } has the answer set
S = { p, a, b,+a,−b } such that E+ = {+a}, F− = {−b}, and (P \F )∪E ∪ {← p }
is inconsistent with (E,F ) = ({a}, {b}). Since S is also U-minimal satisfying this
condition, ({a}, {b}) is the minimal skeptical explanation of p. On the other hand,
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UP ∪ {← not p } has another answer set S′ = { p, a, b,+a } such that E+ = {+a}
and F− = ∅. However, (P \F )∪E ∪ {← p } is consistent with (E,F ) = ({a}, {}),
so that ({a}, {}) is not a skeptical explanation (but a credulous one).
The above results present that (minimal) explanations of extended abduction
are computed by means of answer sets of an update program which is an EDP.
In particular, when a program P is an ELP (resp. NDP, NLP), explanations are
computed by means of answer sets (resp. stable models) of the corresponding update
program which is also an ELP (resp. NDP, NLP).
For computing anti-explanations, we have the following results.
Lemma 3.5 (converting anti-explanations to explanations)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program and G a negative observation. Then, (E,F )
is a (minimal) credulous/skeptical anti-explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉
iff (E,F ) is a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation of a positive observation
G′ with respect to the abductive program 〈P ∪ {G′ ← notG },A〉, where G′ is a
ground atom appearing nowhere in P ∪ A.
In particular, (E,F ) is a (minimal) credulous anti-explanation of G = ⊥ with
respect to 〈P,A〉 iff (E,F ) is a (minimal) credulous explanation of a positive
observation G′ with respect to the abductive program 〈P ∪ {G′ ← not⊥},A〉.
Proof
Put P ′ = P ∪ {G′ ← notG }. Then, G is not included in an answer set S of a
consistent program (P \ F ) ∪ E iff G′ is included in an answer set S ∪ {G′} of
a consistent program (P ′ \ F ) ∪ E. Hence, the result follows. In particular, when
G = ⊥, (P \ F ) ∪ E is consistent iff G′ is included in a consistent answer set of
(P ′ \ F ) ∪ E.
Theorem 3.6 (computing anti-explanations through UP)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program, UP its update program, and G a negative
observation. Also, let G′ be a ground atom appearing nowhere in P ∪A, and P ′ =
P ∪ {G′ ← notG }. Then,
1. (E,F ) is a (minimal) credulous anti-explanation of G iff UP ∪ {← G } has
a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− =
S ∩ UA−.
2. (E,F ) is a skeptical anti-explanation of G iff UP ∪ {G′ ← notG } ∪ {←
notG′ } has a consistent answer set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+, F− =
S ∩UA−, and (P ′ \F )∪E ∪ {← G′ } is inconsistent. In particular, (E,F ) is
a minimal skeptical anti-explanation iff S is U-minimal among those satisfying
the above condition.
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Proof
1. Put UP ′ = UP ∪ {G′ ← notG }. Then, (E,F ) is a (minimal) credulous anti-
explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉
iff (E,F ) is a (minimal) credulous explanation of a positive observation G′ with
respect to 〈P ′,A〉 (Lemma 3.5)
iff UP ′ ∪ {← notG′ } has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S ∪{G′ } such that
E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩ UA− (by Theorem 3.3). When UP ′ ∪ {← notG′ }
has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S ∪ {G′ }, G is not included in S. So
UP ′ ∪ {← notG′ } has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S ∪ {G′ } such that
E+ = S ∩UA+ and F− = S ∩UA− iff UP ∪ {← G } has a consistent (U-minimal)
answer set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩ UA−.
2. (E,F ) is a skeptical anti-explanation of G with respect to 〈P,A〉
iff (E,F ) is a skeptical explanation of a positive observation G′ with respect to
〈P ′,A〉 (Lemma 3.5)
iff UP ′ ∪ {← notG′ } has a consistent answer set S such that E+ = S ∩ UA+,
F− = S ∩ UA−, and (P ′ \ F ) ∪ E ∪ {← G′ } is inconsistent. In particular, (E,F )
is a minimal skeptical anti-explanation iff S is U-minimal among those satisfying
the above condition (Theorem 3.4).
Suppose an abductive program 〈P,A〉 such that P is a normal logic program and
A is a set of atoms. When P is locally stratified in the sense of (Przymusinski, 1988),
P has at most one answer set (called a perfect model). In this case, the above results
are simplified as follows.5
Corollary 3.7 (computing (anti-)explanations in locally stratified NLPs)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program in which P is a locally stratified NLP and A
is the set of abducible atoms. Also, let UP be the update program of 〈P,A〉 and
G a ground atom. Then,
1. A positive observation G has a (minimal) explanation (E,F ) iff the program
UP ∪ {← notG } has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S such that E+ =
S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩ UA−.
2. A negative observation G has a (minimal) anti-explanation (E,F ) iff the
program UP ∪ {← G } has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S such that
E+ = S ∩ UA+ and F− = S ∩ UA−.
Proof
When P is a locally stratified NLP, so is (P \ F )∪E because introducing/deleting
facts to/from P does not break the stratification structure. Then (P \ F ) ∪ E has
5 The result is generalized to the class of programs having at most one stable model.
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at most one answer set. In this case, credulous (anti-)explanations and skeptical
(anti-)explanations coincide. Hence, the results hold by Theorems 3.3 and 3.6.
The results of Theorems 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6 imply that any proof procedure for
computing answer sets in EDPs is used for computing (anti-)explanations of ex-
tended abduction in EDPs. In particular, minimal (anti-)explanations are found by
an additional mechanism of filtering U-minimal ones out of answer sets.
4 View updates through extended abduction
In this section, we characterize the problem of view updates through extended
abduction. We compute view updates by means of update programs in Section 4.1,
and realize the task of integrity maintenance as a special case in Section 4.2.
4.1 View updates
Suppose a knowledge base which contains variable rules and invariable rules. When
there is a request for inserting/deleting a fact to/from the program, the update on
the fact which is derived by invariable rules is translated into updates on variable
rules/facts. This type of updates is called view updates.
Definition 4.1 (view updates)
Let P be a program, V the set of variable rules in the language of P , and G
a ground fact. Then, a program P ′ accomplishes a view update for the insertion
(resp. deletion) of G to/from P if
1. P ′ is consistent,
2. P ′ |= G (resp. P ′ 6|= G),
3. P ′ \ V = P \ V ,
4. there is no consistent program P ′′ such that P ′′ |= G (resp. P ′′ 6|= G),
P ′′ \ V = P \ V , and [(P ∩ V ) ∼ (P ′′ ∩ V )] ⊂ [(P ∩ V ) ∼ (P ′ ∩ V )],
where Q ∼ R = (Q \R) ∪ (R \Q).
By the definition, the updated program P ′ is a consistent program which min-
imally changes the variable part V of P to (un)imply G. Such a program P ′ is
obtained from P by deleting some rules in V ∩ P and introducing some rules in
V \P . In particular, when G ∈ V \P (resp. G ∈ V ∩P ), the insertion (resp. deletion)
is done by directly introducing (resp. deleting) G to/from P . We do not consider
introducing rules in V ∩P and deleting rules in V \P , because introducing any rule
which already exists in P is redundant and deleting any rule which does not exist
in P is meaningless. With this assumption, the third condition P ′ \ V = P \ V of
Definition 4.1 is equivalent to
P ′ = (P \ F ) ∪ E for E ⊆ V \ P and F ⊆ V ∩ P .
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The view update problem is then naturally expressed by an abductive program
〈P, V 〉, where the program P represents a knowledge base and the abducibles V
represent variable rules.
Theorem 4.1 (view updates by extended abduction)
Let P be a program and V the set of variable rules in the language of P . Given
a ground literal G, (P \ F ) ∪ E accomplishes a view update for inserting (resp.
deleting) G iff (E,F ) is a minimal skeptical explanation (resp. minimal credulous
anti-explanation) of the positive observation (resp. negative observation) G with
respect to the abductive program 〈P, V 〉.
Proof
Suppose that P ′ = (P \F )∪E accomplishes the insertion (resp. deletion) ofG. Then,
P ′ is consistent and P ′ |= G (resp. P ′ 6|= G). As E ⊆ V \P and F ⊆ V ∩P , (E,F ) is a
skeptical explanation (resp. credulous anti-explanation) ofG with respect to 〈P, V 〉.
On the other hand, it holds that (P ′∩V )\ (P ∩V ) = E and (P ∩V )\ (P ′∩V ) = F .
Then, by the fourth condition of view updates, there is no E′ ⊆ V \P nor F ′ ⊆ V ∩P
such that (P \F ′)∪E′ |= G (resp. (P \F ′)∪E′ 6|= G) with a consistent (P \F ′)∪E′,
and E′ ∪ F ′ ⊂ E ∪ F . If (P \ F ′) ∪ E′ is consistent and (P \ F ′) ∪ E′ |= G (resp.
(P \ F ′) ∪ E′ 6|= G), then E′ ⊆ E and F ′ ⊆ F imply E′ = E and F ′ = F , because
otherwise E′ ∪ F ′ ⊂ E ∪ F . Thus, (E,F ) is a minimal skeptical explanation (resp.
minimal credulous anti-explanation) of G with respect to 〈P, V 〉. The converse is
obvious by the definition of minimal (anti-)explanations.
To realize view updates through update programs, we first transform the abduc-
tive program 〈P, V 〉 to its normal form 〈P n, V n 〉 with abducible facts V n as pre-
sented in Section 2.2. For E ⊆ V and F ⊆ V , we define n(E)+ = {+a | a ∈ n(E) }
and n(F )− = {−a | a ∈ n(F ) }, where n(·) is the naming function introduced in
Section 2.2. Then, the following results hold.
Theorem 4.2 (view insertion through UP)
Let P be a program, V the set of variable rules in the language of P , and G a
ground literal. Also, let 〈P n, V n 〉 be the normal form of the abductive program
〈P, V 〉, and UP the update program of 〈P n, V n 〉. Then, (P \F )∪E accomplishes
the insertion of G iff
1. S is a consistent answer set of UP ∪ {← notG } such that n(E)+ = S∩UA+,
n(F )− = S ∩ UA−, and (P \ F ) ∪ E ∪ {← G } is inconsistent, and
2. S is U-minimal among those satisfying the condition 1.
Proof
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(P \ F ) ∪ E accomplishes the insertion of G
iff (E,F ) is a minimal skeptical explanation of G with respect to 〈P, V 〉 (Theo-
rem 4.1)
iff (n(E), n(F )) is a minimal skeptical explanation of G with respect to 〈P n, V n 〉
(Proposition 2.1)
iff there exists a consistent U-minimal answer set S of UP ∪ {← notG } satisfying
the conditions 1 and 2 (Theorem 3.4).
Theorem 4.3 (view deletion through UP)
Let P be a program, V the set of variable rules in the language of P , and G a ground
literal. Also, let 〈P n, V n 〉 be the normal form of the abductive program 〈P, V 〉,
and let UP be the update program of 〈P n, V n 〉. Then, (P \ F ) ∪ E accomplishes
the deletion of G iff UP ∪ {← G } has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such
that n(E)+ = S ∩ UA+ and n(F )− = S ∩ UA−.
Proof
(P \ F ) ∪ E accomplishes the deletion of G
iff (E,F ) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of G with respect to 〈P, V 〉 (The-
orem 4.1)
iff (n(E), n(F )) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation ofGwith respect to 〈P n, V n 〉
(Proposition 2.1)
iff S is a consistent U-minimal answer set of UP ∪ {← G } such that n(E)+ =
S ∩ UA+ and n(F )− = S ∩ UA− (Theorem 3.6).
Example 4.1
Let P be the program and V the set of variable rules such that
P : flies(x)← bird(x), not ab(x),
ab(x)← broken-wing(x),
bird(tweety)← ,
bird(opus)← ,
broken-wing(tweety)← .
V : broken-wing(x).
Then, UP becomes
UP : flies(x)← bird(x), not ab(x),
ab(x)← broken-wing(x),
bird(tweety)← ,
bird(opus)← ,
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abd(broken-wing(tweety)), abd(broken-wing(opus)),
−broken-wing(tweety)← not broken-wing(tweety) ,
+broken-wing(opus)← broken-wing(opus) .
To insert flies(tweety), the U-minimal answer set of UP ∪ {← not flies(tweety) }
becomes { flies(tweety), f lies(opus), bird(tweety), bird(opus), broken-wing(tweety),
broken-wing(opus), −broken-wing(tweety) }. Then, (P \ F ) ∪E accomplishes the
insertion of flies(tweety) with (E,F ) = (∅, { broken-wing(tweety) }).
On the other hand, to remove flies(opus), the U-minimal answer set of UP ∪
{← flies(opus) } becomes { bird(tweety), bird(opus), broken-wing(tweety),
broken-wing(opus), ab(tweety), ab(opus), +broken-wing(opus) }. Then, (P\F )∪E
accomplishes the deletion of flies(opus) with (E,F ) = ({ broken-wing(opus) }, ∅).
4.2 Integrity maintenance
Integrity constraints are conditions that a knowledge base should satisfy through
updates. When integrity constraints are violated, variable rules/facts are modified
to restore consistency. Such integrity maintenance is done as a special case of view
updating.
Let I be the set of integrity constraints in a program P . Then, we say that P
violates integrity constraints from I if P \ I has no consistent answer set satisfying
every rule in I. P satisfies integrity constraints from I if P does not violate them.6
Definition 4.2 (integrity maintenance)
Let P be a program and V the set of variable rules in the language of P . Also, let I
be the set of integrity constraints such that I ⊆ P \V . Then, a program P ′ restores
consistency with respect to I if
1. P ′ is consistent,
2. P ′ \ V = P \ V ,
3. there is no consistent program P ′′ such that P ′′ \ V = P \ V and
[(P ∩ V ) ∼ (P ′′ ∩ V )] ⊂ [(P ∩ V ) ∼ (P ′ ∩ V )].
In particular, P ′ = P if P satisfies every integrity constraint in I.
The first condition implies that P ′ satisfies every constraint in I. Note that by
I ⊆ P \V every constraint in I is invariable, so I ⊆ P ′ holds by the second condition.
The third condition requests the minimality of change. By the definition, integrity
maintenance is defined as a special case of view deletion of Definition 4.1 with G =
⊥, i.e., P ′ 6|= ⊥ is equivalent to the first condition. Then, the problem of integrity
maintenance is characterized by an abductive program 〈P, V 〉 and computed by
6 This is the consistency view of integrity satisfaction (Sadri and Kowalski, 1988).
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its update program. The following results directly follow from Theorem 4.1 and
Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.4 (integrity maintenance by extended abduction)
Let P be a program, I ⊆ P integrity constraints, and V the set of variable rules
in the language of P . Then, (P \ F ) ∪ E restores consistency with respect to I iff
(E,F ) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative observation G = ⊥
with respect to 〈P, V 〉.
Theorem 4.5 (integrity maintenance through UP)
Let P be a program, I ⊆ P integrity constraints, and V the set of variable rules
in the language of P . Also, let 〈P n, V n 〉 be the normal form of the abductive
program 〈P, V 〉, and UP the update program of 〈P n, V n 〉. Then, (P \ F ) ∪ E
restores consistency with respect to I iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set
S such that n(E)+ = S ∩ UA+ and n(F )− = S ∩ UA−.
Example 4.2
Let 〈P, V 〉 be the abductive program such that
P : employee(john, 35)←,
manager(john)←,
← employee(x, y), manager(x), not talented(x), y < 40 .
V : manager(x), talented(x).
The integrity constraint enforces the condition that any employee does not become
a manager under the age 40 unless he/she is talented. The UP of this program
becomes
UP : employee(john, 35)←,
← employee(x, y), manager(x), not talented(x), y < 40 .
abd(manager(x)), abd(talented(x)),
−manager(john)← notmanager(john),
+talented(x)← talented(x),
which has two U-minimal answer sets:
{ employee(john, 35), manager(john), −manager(john), talented(john)},
{ employee(john, 35), manager(john), +talented(john), talented(john) }.
That is, removing manager(john) or inserting talented(john) restores consistency
with respect to the integrity constraint.
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5 Theory updates
In this section, we characterize the problem of theory updates through extended ab-
duction. We first consider updating a knowledge base by a single rule in Section 5.1,
then generalize the result to updating by a program in Section 5.2. Inconsistency
removal is formalized as a special case of theory updates in Section 5.3.
5.1 Updates with a rule
Suppose that an update request for inserting/deleting a rule is brought to a knowl-
edge base in which every rule is variable. In this case, an update is done by directly
inserting/deleting the rule to/from the program.
Definition 5.1 (updates with a rule)
Let P be a program and R a rule such that R 6∈ P . Then, P ′ accomplishes the
insertion of R to P if
1. P ′ is consistent,
2. {R} ⊆ P ′ ⊆ P ∪ {R},
3. there is no consistent program P ′′ such that P ′ ⊂ P ′′ ⊆ P ∪ {R}.
On the other hand, for a program P and a rule R such that R ∈ P , P ′ accomplishes
the deletion of R from P if
1. P ′ is consistent,
2. P ′ ⊆ P \ {R},
3. there is no consistent program P ′′ such that P ′ ⊂ P ′′ ⊆ P \ {R}.
In the above definition, the second conditions present that the updated program
P ′ includes/excludes the rule R, and the third conditions present that P ′ minimally
changes the original program P by inserting/deleting R to/from P .
We first show that the problem of deleting a rule from a program in Definition 5.1
is converted to the problem of inserting a rule to a program.
Proposition 5.1 (converting deletion of a rule to insertion of a rule)
Let P be a program and R a rule in P . Then, there is a program P ′ which accom-
plishes the deletion of R from P iff there is a program PR′ which accomplishes the
insertion of the rule ← γR to the program PR = (P \ {R})∪ {Σ← Γ, γR, γR ←}
where R = (Σ← Γ).
Proof
Suppose that P ′ accomplishes the deletion of R from P . Put PR′ = P ′ ∪ {Σ ←
Γ, γR, ← γR }. Then, by P ′ ⊆ P \{R}, PR′ ⊆ (P \{R}) ∪ {Σ← Γ, γR, ← γR }
holds, thereby {← γR } ⊆ PR′ ⊆ PR ∪ {← γR }. As P ′ is consistent, PR′ is
consistent. Assume that there is a consistent program PR′′ such that PR′ ⊂ PR′′ ⊆
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PR∪{← γR }. Put P ′′ = PR′′\{Σ← Γ, γR, ← γR }. Then, PR′′ ⊆ PR∪{← γR }
implies PR′′ ⊆ (P \{R}) ∪ {Σ← Γ, γR, γR ←} ∪ {← γR }, thereby P ′′ ⊆ P \{R}.
On the other hand, PR′ ⊂ PR′′ implies P ′ ∪{Σ← Γ, γR, ← γR } ⊂ PR′′, thereby
P ′ ⊂ PR′′ \ {Σ ← Γ, γR, ← γR }. Then, P
′ ⊂ P ′′. Thus, P ′ ⊂ P ′′ ⊆ P \ {R}
holds, which contradicts the fact that there is no such P ′′. Hence, PR′ accomplishes
the insertion of ← γR to PR.
Conversely, suppose that PR′ accomplishes the insertion of ← γR to PR. Put
P ′ = PR′ \ {Σ ← Γ, γR, ← γR }. Then, by PR′ ⊆ PR ∪ {← γR }, P ′ ⊆ P \ {R}
holds. As PR′ is consistent, P ′ is consistent. Assume that there is a consistent
program P ′′ such that P ′ ⊂ P ′′ ⊆ P \ {R}. Put PR′′ = P ′′ ∪ {Σ← Γ, γR, ← γR }.
Then, by P ′ ∪ {Σ ← Γ, γR, ← γR } = PR′ and P \ {R} ∪ {Σ← Γ, γR, ← γR } ⊆
PR ∪ {← γR }, it holds that PR′ ⊂ PR′′ ⊆ PR ∪ {← γR }, which contradicts the
fact that there is no such PR′′. Hence, P ′ accomplishes the deletion of R from P .
By Proposition 5.1, for updating a program with a rule, it is enough to consider
the problem of inserting a rule to a program. We study the problem in a more
general setting in the next subsection.
5.2 Updates with programs
This section considers an update which updates a program with another program.
Given a program P which represents the current knowledge base and another pro-
gram Q which represents new information, a theory update is defined to satisfy the
following conditions.
Definition 5.2 (theory updates)
Given programs P and Q, P ′ accomplishes a theory update of P by Q if
1. P ′ is consistent,
2. Q ⊆ P ′ ⊆ P ∪Q,
3. there is no consistent program P ′′ such that P ′ ⊂ P ′′ ⊆ P ∪Q.
By the definition, the updated program P ′ is defined as the union of the new
information Q and a maximal subset of the original program P which is consistent
with Q. The first condition implies that new information Q should be consistent,
namely, updating with inconsistent information makes no sense. With this defini-
tion, inserting a rule to a theory of Definition 5.1 is captured as a special case of
a theory update of Definition 5.2 in which a new program Q is given as a single
rule. In contrast to this, it is considered a theory update which is defined as the
removal of Q from P like P ′ ⊆ P \ Q. For such updates, the transformation of
Proposition 5.1 is applied for each rule in Q. Then the problem of removing Q is
converted to the problem of introducing corresponding rules as in Definition 5.2.
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To realize theory updates, an abductive framework is used for specifying priorities
between the current knowledge and the new knowledge. Consider the abductive
program 〈P ∪ Q,P \ Q 〉, where a program is given as P ∪ Q and any rule in
the original program P other than the new information Q is specified as variable
abducible rules.
Theorem 5.2 (theory updates by extended abduction)
Let P and Q be programs. Then, P ′ accomplishes a theory update of P by Q
iff P ′ = (P ∪ Q) \ F where (∅, F ) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the
negative observationG = ⊥ with respect to the abductive program 〈P ∪Q,P \Q 〉.
Proof
P ′ accomplishes a theory update of P by Q
iff P ′ = (P∪Q)\F where F is a minimal set such that F ⊆ P \Q and (P∪Q)\F 6|= ⊥
iff P ′ = (P ∪ Q) \ F where (∅, F ) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the
negative observation G = ⊥ with respect to 〈P ∪Q,P \Q 〉.
The abductive program 〈P ∪Q,P \Q 〉 is transformed to the normal form 〈 (P ∪
Q)n, (P \ Q)n 〉 where (P \ Q)n consists of abducible facts (Section 2.2). Then,
a minimal credulous anti-explanation of G = ⊥ is computed by a consistent U-
minimal answer set of the update program of 〈 (P ∪ Q)n, (P \ Q)n 〉. Note that in
〈 (P ∪Q)n, (P \Q)n 〉 it holds that (P \Q)n \ (P ∪Q)n = ∅, so UP contains no rule
of the form +a← a of Definition 3.1(2).
Theorem 5.3 (theory updates through UP)
Let P and Q be programs, and UP the update program of the abductive program
〈 (P ∪Q)n, (P \Q)n 〉. Then, (P ∪Q) \ F accomplishes a theory update of P by Q
iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that n(F−) = S ∩ UA−.
Proof
(P ∪Q) \ F accomplishes a theory update of P by Q
iff (∅, F ) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative observation G = ⊥
with respect to 〈P ∪Q,P \Q 〉 (Theorem 5.2)
iff (∅, n(F )) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of G = ⊥ with respect to
〈 (P ∪Q)n, (P \Q)n 〉 (Proposition 2.1)
iff UP ∪ {← ⊥} has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that n(F−) =
S ∩ UA− (Theorem 3.6).
iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that n(F−) = S ∩ UA−.
Example 5.1 (Alferes et al.(2000))
Given the current knowledge base
P1 : sleep← not tv on ,
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watch tv ← tv on ,
tv on← ,
consider updating P1 with
7
P2 : power failure← ,
← power failure, tv on .
The situation is expressed by the abductive program 〈P1∪P2, P1 \P2 〉. The update
program UP of 〈 (P1 ∪ P2)n, (P1 \ P2)n 〉 then becomes
UP : power failure← ,
← power failure, tv on ,
sleep← not tv on, γ1 ,
watch tv ← tv on, γ2 ,
abd(tv on), abd(γ1), abd(γ2),
−tv on← not tv on ,
−γ1 ← not γ1 ,
−γ2 ← not γ2 ,
where γ1 and γ2 are the names of the abducible rules in P1 \ P2. Then, UP has
the unique U-minimal answer set { power failure, sleep, tv on, −tv on, γ1, γ2 },
which represents the deletion of the fact tv on from P1∪P2. As a result, the theory
update of P1 by P2 becomes
P3 : sleep← not tv on ,
watch tv ← tv on ,
power failure← ,
← power failure, tv on .
Next, suppose that another update
P4 : ¬ power failure←
is given to P3 which states that power is back again. The situation is expressed
by the abductive program 〈P3 ∪ P4, P3 \ P4 〉, and the update program of 〈 (P3 ∪
7 In (Alferes et al., 2000) the rule “← power failure, tv on” is given as “not tv on ←
power failure”. These two rules are semantically equivalent under the answer set semantics
(Inoue and Sakama, 1998).
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P4)
n, (P3 \ P4)n 〉 becomes
UP : ¬ power failure← ,
sleep← not tv on , γ1 ,
watch tv ← tv on , γ2 ,
← power failure, tv on , γ3 ,
abd(power failure), abd(γ1), abd(γ2), abd(γ3),
−power failure← not power failure ,
−γ1 ← not γ1, −γ2 ← not γ2, −γ3 ← not γ3 .
Then, UP has the unique U-minimal answer set {¬ power failure, sleep, γ1, γ2,
γ3, power failure, −power failure }, which implies that the result of the update
is (P3 ∪ P4) \ { power failure←}.
Generally, there are several solutions for updating a program P by Q. For exam-
ple, let P = { p ← q, q ←} and Q = {¬p ←}. Then, there are two solutions of
updating P by Q; removing either p ← q or q ← from P . Every answer set which
results from multiple solutions is expressed by a single program as follows.
Suppose updating P by Q. Then, define the program
Π = Q ∪ {Σ← Γ, γR, abd(γR) | R = (Σ← Γ) ∈ P } .
Let ∆ = { γR | γR appears in Π }. A consistent answer set S of Π is called ∆-
maximal if S is an answer set of Π such that T ∩ ∆ ⊆ S ∩ ∆ for any answer set
T of Π. Let LP∪Q be the set of all ground literals in the language of the program
P ∪Q. Then the following result holds.
Theorem 5.4 (representing multiple solutions in a single program)
Let P and Q be programs and P ′ a result of a theory update of P by Q. Also,
let Π be a program defined as above. Then, for any answer set S of P ′, there is
a ∆-maximal answer set T of Π such that S = T ∩ LP∪Q. Conversely, for any
∆-maximal answer set T of Π, there is a program P ′ which has an answer set S
such that S = T ∩ LP∪Q.
Proof
When P ′ accomplishes a theory update of P by Q, P ′ = Q ∪ P ′′ where P ′′ is a
maximal subset of P such that Q ∪ P ′′ is consistent. Consider the program Π′ =
Q ∪ {Σ ← Γ, γR, γR ←| R = (Σ ← Γ) ∈ P ′′ }. Then, for any answer set S of P ′,
there is an answer set T ′ of Π′ such that S = T ′ ∩ LP∪Q. In this case, there is an
answer set T of Π such that T = T ′ ∪ { γR | γR ∈ ∆ \ T ′ }. Suppose that T is not
∆-maximal. Then, there is an answer set T ′′ of Π such that T ′ ∩∆ ⊂ T ′′ ∩∆. In
this case, there is a consistent answer set S′ of Q ∪ P ′′′ such that S′ = T ′′ ∩ LP∪Q
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and P ′′ ⊂ P ′′′ ⊆ P . This contradicts the assumption that P ′′ is a maximal subset
of P such that Q∪P ′′ is consistent. Hence, T is a ∆-maximal answer set of Π. The
converse is shown in a similar manner.
Example 5.2
In the above example, the program Π becomes
Π : ¬p←,
p← q, γ1,
q ← γ2,
abd(γ1), abd(γ2).
Then, the ∆-maximal answer sets of Π are {¬p, γ1, γ2 } and {¬p, q, γ1, γ2 }, which
correspond to the answer sets of the updated programs { p ← q, ¬p ←} and
{ q ←, ¬p←}, respectively.
5.3 Inconsistency removal
A knowledge base may become inconsistent by the presence of contradictory infor-
mation. In this situation, a knowledge base must be updated to restore consistency
by detecting the source of inconsistency in the program. Such an inconsistency
removal is defined as follows.
Definition 5.3 (inconsistency removal)
Let P be a program. Then, a program P ′ accomplishes an inconsistency removal
of P if
1. P ′ is consistent,
2. P ′ ⊆ P ,
3. there is no consistent program P ′′ such that P ′ ⊂ P ′′ ⊆ P .
In particular, P ′ = P if P is consistent.
By the definition, inconsistency removal is captured as a special case of theory
updates where P is possibly inconsistent and Q is empty in Definition 5.2. Then,
by putting Q = ∅ in 〈P ∪Q,P \Q 〉, inconsistency removal is characterized by the
abductive program 〈P, P 〉. The next theorem directly follows from Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.5 (inconsistency removal by extended abduction)
Let P be a program. Then, P ′ accomplishes an inconsistency removal of P iff
P ′ = P \ F where (∅, F ) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative
observation G = ⊥ with respect to the abductive program 〈P, P 〉.
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In an EDP, inconsistency arises when a program P has the contradictory answer
set LP or P has no answer set. An abductive program 〈P, P 〉 can remove these
different types of inconsistencies.
Example 5.3
Let P = { p ← not p, q ←} which has no answer set. Then, G = ⊥ has the
minimal credulous (and also skeptical) anti-explanation (E,F ) = (∅, { p← not p })
with respect to 〈P, P 〉. As a result, P ′ = { q ←} accomplishes an inconsistency
removal of P .
The following result holds by Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 5.6 (inconsistency removal through UP)
Let P be a program and UP the update program of the abductive program 〈P n, P n 〉
which is a normal form of 〈P, P 〉. Then, P\F accomplishes an inconsistency removal
of P iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that n(F−) = S ∩UA−.
Example 5.4
Let P be the program
pacifist← quaker ,
¬pacifist← republican ,
quaker← , republican← ,
which has the answer set LP . Consider the update program UP of the abductive
program 〈P n, P n 〉:
UP : pacifist← quaker, γ1 ,
¬pacifist← republican, γ2 ,
abd(γ1), abd(γ2), abd(quaker), abd(republican),
−γ1 ← not γ1,
−γ2 ← not γ2,
−quaker← not quaker ,
−republican← not republican .
Then, UP has four U-minimal answer sets:
{ quaker, republican, pacifist, γ1, γ2,−γ2 },
{ quaker, republican, ¬pacifist, γ1, γ2, −γ1 },
{ quaker, republican, γ1, γ2, ¬pacifist, −quaker },
{ quaker, republican, pacifist, γ1, γ2, −republican },
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which represent that deletion of one of the rules (or facts) from P makes the program
consistent.
The multiplicity of possible solutions as in the above example is expressed by a
single program using the technique of Theorem 5.4. On the other hand, if one wants
to restrict the set of rules to be removed, it is done by considering an abductive
program 〈P, P ′ 〉 with P ′ ⊆ P . In this case, any rule in P ′ is subject to change to
recover consistency.
6 Computational complexity
In this section, we compare the computational complexity of different types of
updates. Throughout the section, we consider propositional abductive programs,
i.e., an abductive program 〈P,A〉 where P is a finite EDP containing no variable
and A is a finite set of ground literals. An observation G is a ground literal. We
also assume an abductive program 〈P,A〉 where A consists of abducible facts. An
abductive program with abducible rules is transformed to an abductive program
with abducible facts by considering its normal form (see Section 2.2).
We first investigate the complexity of extended abduction. The decision problems
considered here are analogous to those of (Eiter et al., 1997), that is, given an
abductive program 〈P,A〉 and a positive/negative observation G:
Existence: Does G have an (anti-)explanation with respect to 〈P,A〉?
Relevance: Is a given abducible A ∈ A included in some (anti-)explanation (E,F )
of G (i.e., A ∈ E ∪ F )?
Necessity: Is a given abducible A ∈ A included in every (anti-)explanation of G?
Since the existence of (anti-)explanations implies the existence of minimal (anti-
)explanations, deciding the existence of a minimal (anti-)explanation is as hard
as deciding the existence of an arbitrary one. Similarly, considering minimal (anti-
)explanations instead of arbitrary ones brings the same result in the necessity prob-
lem. By contrast, the relevance problem has different complexity results between
arbitrary and minimal (anti-)explanations in general.
To analyze the complexity of each problem, we first introduce a transformation
from extended abduction to normal abduction based on the one in (Inoue, 2000).8
This transformation enables us to use the complexity results of normal abduction.
Suppose an abductive program 〈P,A〉 where A consists of abducible facts. We
define an abductive program 〈P ′,A′ 〉 such that
P ′ = (P \ A) ∪ {A← notA′ | A ∈ A ∩ P },
A′ = (A \ P ) ∪ {A′ | A ∈ A ∩ P },
where A′’s are ground literals associated with each A and appear nowhere in P ∪A.
In the abductive program 〈P ′,A′ 〉, any abducible in A∩P is made non-abducible
8 Recall that by normal abduction we mean abduction which explains a positive observation only
by introducing hypotheses.
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and a new abducible A′ is introduced for each A ∈ A ∩ P . With this setting, the
removal of A ∈ A ∩ P from P is achieved by the introduction of A′ ∈ A′ to P ′ by
the rule A← notA′. The next proposition is due to (Inoue, 2000).9
Proposition 6.1 (transformation from extended abduction to normal abduction)
Let 〈P,A〉 be an abductive program and G a ground literal.
1. A positive observation G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation
(E,F ) with respect to 〈P,A〉 under extended abduction iff G has a (minimal)
credulous/skeptical explanation H = E ∪ {A′ | A ∈ F } with respect to
〈P ′,A′ 〉 under normal abduction.
2. A negative observationG has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical anti-explanation
(E,F ) with respect to 〈P,A〉 under extended abduction iff G′ has a (mini-
mal) credulous/skeptical explanation H = E ∪ {A′ | A ∈ F } with respect
to 〈P ′ ∪ {G′ ← notG },A′ 〉 under normal abduction, where G′ is a ground
atom appearing nowhere in P ∪ A.
Proof
1. By the definition, an abducible A ∈ A ∩ P is not in P \ F iff A′ ∈ A′ is in
P ′∪{A′ | A ∈ F }. Then, (P \F )∪E has an answer set S iff P ′∪H has an answer
set S ∪ {A′ | A ∈ F }. Hence, G has a credulous/skeptical explanation (E,F )
with respect to 〈P,A〉 under extended abduction iff G has a credulous/skeptical
explanation H = E ∪ {A′ | A ∈ F } with respect to 〈P ′,A′ 〉 under normal
abduction. In particular, (E,F ) is minimal iff E ∪ F is minimal iff H is minimal.
2. By Lemma 3.5, G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical anti-explanation (E,F )
with respect to 〈P,A〉 under extended abduction iff a positive observation G′ has
a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation (E,F ) with respect to 〈P ∪ {G′ ←
notG },A〉 under extended abduction. Then, the result holds by the part 1 of this
proposition.
Thus, extended abduction is efficiently converted into normal abduction. On the
other hand, normal abduction is captured as a special case of extended abduction.
That is, given an abductive program 〈P,A〉 and a positive observation G, G has a
(minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation E with respect to 〈P,A〉 under normal
abduction iff G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation (E, ∅) with respect
to 〈P,A〉 under extended abduction.
We use these results for assessing the complexity of extended abduction.
Proposition 6.2 (complexity results for normal abduction (Eiter et al., 1997))
9 The proposition is given in a more general setting in (Inoue, 2000), but the definition of (anti-
)explanations in (Inoue, 2000) is a bit different from the one in this paper.
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Given a propositional abductive program 〈P,A〉 and a ground positive observation
G:
(a) Deciding ifG has a credulous/skeptical explanation is ΣP2 -complete/Σ
P
3 -complete.
(b) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is relevant to some credulous/skeptical ex-
planation (resp. some minimal credulous/skeptical explanation) of G is ΣP2 -
complete/ΣP3 -complete (resp. Σ
P
3 -complete/Σ
P
4 -complete).
(c) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is necessary for every (minimal) credu-
lous/skeptical explanation of G is ΠP2 -complete/Π
P
3 -complete.
In particular, when P contains no disjunctive rules (i.e., P is an ELP), the com-
plexity of each problem decreases by one level in the polynomial hierarchy.10
Theorem 6.3 (complexity results for extended abduction)
Let 〈P,A〉 be a propositional abductive program.
1. Given a ground positive observation G:
(a) Deciding if G has a credulous/skeptical explanation is ΣP2 -complete/Σ
P
3 -
complete.
(b) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is relevant to some credulous/skeptical
explanation (resp. some minimal credulous/skeptical explanation) of G is
ΣP2 -complete/Σ
P
3 -complete (resp. Σ
P
3 -complete/Σ
P
4 -complete).
(c) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is necessary for every (minimal) credu-
lous/skeptical explanation of G is ΠP2 -complete/Π
P
3 -complete.
2. Given a ground negative observation G:
(a) Deciding ifG has a credulous/skeptical anti-explanation ΣP2 -complete/Σ
P
3 -
complete.
(b) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is relevant to some credulous/skeptical
anti-explanation (resp. someminimal credulous/skeptical anti-explanation)
of G is ΣP2 -complete/Σ
P
3 -complete (resp. Σ
P
3 -complete/Σ
P
4 -complete).
(c) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is necessary for every (minimal) credu-
lous/skeptical anti-explanation of G is ΠP2 -complete/Π
P
3 -complete.
In particular, when P contains no disjunctive rules (i.e., P is an ELP), the com-
plexity of each problem decreases by one level in the polynomial hierarchy.
Proof
10 In (Eiter et al., 1997) the results are reported for normal logic/disjunctive programs, but the
same results hold for extended logic/disjunctive programs.
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1. For explaining positive observations, extended abduction includes normal abduc-
tion as a special case. Then, the hardness results of (a)–(c) hold by the correspond-
ing decision problems of Proposition 6.2. Since extended abduction is efficiently
translated into normal abduction (Proposition 6.1), the membership results hold.
2. Any credulous/skepcitcal anti-explanation ofG with respect to 〈P,A〉 is equiv-
alent to a credulous/skeptical explanation of G′ with respect to 〈P ∪ {G′ ←
notG },A〉 (Lemma 3.5). Then, the results hold by the part 1 of this theorem.
The complexity results of extended abduction imply the complexity of view up-
dates and theory updates. In what follows, we say that a view update or a theory
update has a solution if there is an updated program which fulfills an update re-
quest.
Theorem 6.4 (complexity results for view updates)
Let 〈P,A〉 be a propositional abductive program which represents a view update
problem. Given a ground literal G:
(a) Deciding if a view update has a solution in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is ΣP3 -
complete (resp. ΣP2 -complete) for insertingG, and Σ
P
2 -complete (resp. NP-complete)
for deleting G.
(b) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is relevant to a solution of a view update in
an EDP (resp. ELP) P is ΣP4 -complete (resp. Σ
P
3 -complete) for inserting G, and
ΣP3 -complete (resp. Σ2-complete) for deleting G.
(c) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is necessary for every solution of a view update
in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is ΠP3 -complete (resp. Π
P
2 -complete) for inserting G,
and ΠP2 -complete (resp. co-NP-complete) for deleting G.
Proof
(a) Deciding the existence of a solution which accomplishes a view update for
inserting (resp. deleting) G is equivalent to the problem of deciding the existence
of a skeptical explanation (resp. a credulous anti-explanation) of G with respect to
〈P,A〉 (Theorem 4.1). Hence, the result follows by Theorem 6.3-1,2(a). The results
of (b) and (c) also follow from the corresponding decision problems of extended
abduction of Theorem 6.3-1,2(b),(c).
Theorem 6.5 (complexity results for theory updates)
Let 〈P,A〉 be a propositional abductive program which represents a theory update
problem.
(a) Deciding if a theory update has a solution in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is ΣP2 -
complete (resp. NP-complete).
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(b) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is relevant to a solution of a theory update in
an EDP (resp. ELP) P is ΣP3 -complete (resp. Σ2-complete).
(c) Deciding if an abducible A ∈ A is necessary for every solution of a theory
update in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is ΠP2 -complete (resp. co-NP-complete).
Proof
(a) Deciding the existence of a solution of a theory update is equivalent to the
problem of deciding the existence of a credulous anti-explanation of G = ⊥ with
respect to 〈P,A〉 (Theorem 5.2). Hence, the result holds by Theorem 6.3-2(a).
The results of (b) and (c) also follow from the corresponding decision problems of
extended abduction of Theorem 6.3-2(b),(c).
Corollary 6.6 (complexity results for consistency restoration)
Let 〈P,A〉 be a propositional abductive program which represents an integrity
maintenance (or inconsistency removal) problem.
(a) Deciding if an integrity maintenance (or inconsistency removal) has a solution
in an EDP (resp. ELP) is ΣP2 -complete (resp. NP-complete).
(b) Deciding if an abducible a ∈ A is relevant to a solution of an integrity main-
tenance (or inconsistency removal) in an EDP (resp. ELP) is ΣP3 -complete (resp.
Σ2-complete).
(c) Deciding if an abducible a ∈ A is necessary for every solution of an integrity
maintenance (or inconsistency removal) in an EDP (resp. ELP) is ΠP2 -complete
(resp. co-NP-complete).
Proof
Since integrity maintenance or inconsistency removal is characterized as a special
case of view deletion or theory update, the decision problems of these tasks have
the same complexities as the corresponding problems of view deletion or theory
update.
The complexity results are summarized in Table 1. In the table, every entry
represents completeness for the respective class. Also, consistency restoration means
integrity maintenance or inconsistency removal.
These complexity results show that decision problems for view insertion are gen-
erally harder than those of view deletion by one level of the polynomial hierarchy,
while problems for theory updates and consistency restoration are as hard as those
for view deletion.
7 Related work
There are a large number of studies which concern (normal) abduction and up-
dates in logic programs and deductive databases. In this section, we mainly discuss
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Table 1. Complexity results for program updates
Update EDP/ELP existence relevance necessity
view insertion ΣP3 /Σ
P
2 Σ
P
4 /Σ
P
3 Π
P
3 /Π
P
2
view deletion ΣP2 /NP Σ
P
3 /Σ
P
2 Π
P
2 /co-NP
theory update ΣP2 /NP Σ
P
3 /Σ
P
2 Π
P
2 /co-NP
consistency restoration ΣP2 /NP Σ
P
3 /Σ
P
2 Π
P
2 /co-NP
comparison with studies which handle nonmonotonic logic programs or deductive
databases with negation.
7.1 Abduction
There are a number of procedures for computing normal abduction. Studies (Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989;
Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a; Decker, 1996; Denecker and de Schreye, 1998) intro-
duce top-down procedures for normal abduction. Top-down procedures efficiently
compute abduction in a goal-driven manner, and the above procedures are correct
for locally stratified NLPs. In unstratified programs, however, top-down (abductive)
procedures are generally incorrect under the stable model semantics. By contrast,
there exist correct top-down procedures in unstratified programs under different
semantics. For instance, Dung (1991) shows that Eshghi and Kowalski’s abductive
procedure is correct with respect to the preferred extensions. Brogi et al. (1995)
extend Kakas and Mancarella’s procedure to extended logic programs, which works
correctly under the three-valued stable model semantics. Alferes et al. (1999) pro-
pose a tabled procedure for normal abduction under the well-founded semantics.
These procedures compute positive explanations for positive observations in the
context of normal abduction, while negative explanations or anti-explanations in
extended abduction are not directly computed by these procedures. On the other
hand, (Console et al., 1991; Fung and Kowalski, 1997) provide bottom-up proce-
dures which compute normal abduction through Clark’s program completion. Using
program completion, one can compute anti-explanations by treating the negative
observation p as ¬p for the atom p in the completion formula. However, these
procedures are also restricted to programs where completion is well-defined.
The approach taken in this paper is based on the computation of answer sets,
which is executed in a bottom-up manner. This is the so-called answer set program-
ming (ASP) which attracts much attention recently (Marek and Truszczyn´ski, 1999;
Niemela¨, 1999; Lifschitz, 2002). Some researchers apply ASP to computing normal
abduction. Inoue and Sakama (1996) introduce a procedure for normal abduction,
which is based on the bottom-up fixpoint computation of extended disjunctive pro-
grams. Eiter et al. (1999) develop the system called dlv which has a front-end for
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abductive diagnoses in normal disjunctive programs. These two studies use program
transformations from abductive programs to disjunctive programs and find cred-
ulous (minimal) explanations of normal abduction using bottom-up computation
of answer sets or stable models. This paper introduced a program transformation
from abductive programs to update programs, but it is different from these studies
in the following points. First, update programs are prepared for extended abduc-
tion and can compute negative (anti-)explanations as well as positive ones. Second,
we provide methods of computing both credulous and skeptical (minimal) expla-
nations through update programs. Satoh and Iwayama (1991) provide a transfor-
mation from abductive programs to normal logic programs under the stable model
semantics, and Toni and Kowalski (1995) provide another transformation under the
argumentation framework. These transformations are applied to normal abduction
and do not consider disjunctive programs.
Update programs are simple and applied to a broader class of abductive programs,
and extended abduction is realized by any procedure for computing answer sets of
EDPs.11 Moreover, since extended abduction includes normal abduction as a spe-
cial case, update programs are also used for computing normal abduction in EDPs.
To compute extended abduction, (Inoue and Sakama, 1999) introduced a transac-
tion program which is a set of production rules to compute (anti-)explanations by
fixpoint construction. The procedure works correctly in acyclic covered NLPs. In-
oue (2000) introduces a simple program transformation from extended abduction to
normal abduction in general EDPs. Using the transformation, extended abduction
is executed via normal abduction.
7.2 View update
In deductive databases, update requests on view definitions are considered observa-
tions and extensional facts are identified with abducible hypotheses. Then, abduc-
tion is viewed as the process of identifying possible changes on extensional facts.
Early studies which realize view updating through abduction are based on this
idea (Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a; Bry, 1990; Console et al., 1995; Decker, 1996).
However, existing approaches characterize the view update problem using normal
abduction, which result in somewhat indirect formulations for representing fact
removal or view deletion. For instance, Kakas and Mancarella (1990a) realize the
deletion of a fact A by the introduction of a new atom A∗ which represents notA
together with the integrity constraints ← A,A∗ and A ∨ A∗. Bry (1990) specifies
the deletion of a fact A using the meta-predicate new(¬A). Console et al. (1995)
realize the deletion of a fact A by the insertion of ¬A under program completion.
Bry and Console et al. handle normal logic programs, so that this conversion causes
no problem. However, deleting A and inserting ¬A have different effects when the
background program contains negative facts explicitly as in extended logic pro-
grams.
11 In implementation, some restrictions on programs such as function-free and range-restricted
conditions would be necessary.
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Procedurally, (Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a; Console et al., 1995) separate the
process of view updating into two-steps; computing abductive explanations in the
intensional database and updating base facts in the extensional database. Such a
separation is effective to reduce the cost of extensional database accesses, while
it does not reflect the current state of the extensional database and may lead to
redundant computation. For instance, consider the program:
p← a1, b,
· · ·
p← ak, b,
a1 ←, . . . , ak ← .
where ai (i = 1, . . . , k) and b are extensional facts. Given the update request to in-
sert p, Kakas and Mancarella (1990a) and Console et al. (1995) compute k minimal
explanations {a1, b}, . . . , {ak, b} in the intensional database, which are evaluated in
the extensional database. Such computation is unnecessary and ineffective, since
{b} is the unique minimal explanation of p. Decker (1996) introduces an improved
version of the abductive procedure which avoids such redundant computation by
including base facts in the input of refutation processes. However, (Decker, 1996)
does not take base facts into account during the consistency derivations. As a result,
it often fails to obtain correct solutions (Mayol and Teniente, 1999). Abductive pro-
cedures of (Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a; Decker, 1996) are top-down and the cor-
rectness is guaranteed for locally stratified NLPs. Similarly, view updating based on
SLDNF-like top-down procedures such as (Decker, 1990; Guessoum and Lloyd, 1990;
Guessoum and Lloyd, 1991; Teniente and Olive, 1995) have restrictions on the pro-
gram syntax. By contrast, our method is based on the computation of answer sets,
which is executed in a bottom-up manner and is applicable to any EDP. Bry (1990)
and Console et al. (1995) also compute view updates in a bottom-up manner. The
former specifies update procedures in a meta-program and the latter uses Clark’s
completion. They realize view updates in normal logic programs and do not handle
disjunctions nor explicit negation in a program. For updating disjunctive programs,
(Grant et al.,1993; Fernandez et al., 1996) provide algorithms for view updates in
propositional NDPs. The former provides a top-down algorithm to compute view
updates in stratified disjunctive programs, while the latter achieves view updates in
NDPs by bottom-up computation. Fernandez et al. (1996) first compute all possi-
ble models from the Herbrand base of extensional facts, then minimal models that
satisfy updates are constructed from those models. By contrast, we compute the
answer sets of an update program and select the U-minimal ones, which is usually
a much smaller set and is easier than (Fernandez et al., 1996).
In deductive databases, integrity maintenance is often coupled with view updat-
ing (Mayol and Teniente, 1999). Concerning studies which handle integrity main-
tenance in nonmonotonic logic programs, (Teniente and Olive, 1995; Decker, 1996)
merge transactions of view updates and integrity maintenance in SLDNF-like top-
down procedures. These procedures are sound and (Teniente and Olive, 1995) is
also complete for computing view updates satisfying integrity constraints in locally
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stratified logic programs. Abductive procedures in (Kakas and Mancarella, 1990b;
Brogi et al., 1995; Toni and Kowalski, 1995) also check integrity constraints in the
process of computing candidate hypotheses. Compared with these studies, our ap-
proach in Section 4.2 is based on the computation of answer sets and is applicable
to non-stratified, disjunctive, and extended logic programs.
7.3 Theory update
Fagin et al. (1983) formalize theory updates for inserting/deleting a single sentence
to/from a first-order theory. According to their definition, a theory T accomplishes
the insertion of the sentence σ if σ ∈ T , while T accomplishes the deletion of
σ if σ 6∈ Th(T ) where Th(·) is the set of sentences proved by T . These defini-
tions of insertion and deletion are not symmetric, i.e., derived sentences are taken
into consideration in deletion, while they are not considered in insertion. In fact,
if deletion is defined by σ 6∈ Th(T ), it seems natural to define insertion also by
σ ∈ Th(T ). In this paper, we achieve updates on derived facts by view updates,
while explicit insertion/deletion of a sentence itself is distinguished as theory up-
dates in Section 5.1. Our Definition 5.1 is symmetric for insertion and deletion of
sentences. Fagin et al.’s update semantics is also characterized by extended abduc-
tion in (Inoue and Sakama, 1995), hence it is computable via update programs. In
(Fagin et al., 1986) they extended the framework to updating a theory by several
sentences. The definition of their batch insertion is close to the definition of our
theory update of Definition 5.2. A difference is that they handle first-order theo-
ries, while we consider nonmonotonic logic programs. Moreover, they provide no
computational method to realize theory updates.
Alferes et al. (2000) introduce the framework of dynamic logic programming which
realizes theory updates in nonmonotonic logic programs. They represent updates
using meta-rules which specify changes between different states, and the result
of update is reflected by the stable models of the updated program. Compared
with our framework, (Alferes et al., 2000) computes stable models of an updated
program but does not compute an updated program at the object level. Moreover,
the effect of updates is also different from ours. In Example 5.1, updating P1 with
a series of updates P2 and P4 results in the program which has the answer set
{¬power failure, sleep }. Interestingly, however, starting from the same knowledge
base and applying the same updates,12 (Alferes et al., 2000) revives the original
program P1 and concludes { tv on, watch tv }. Thus, after power is back up again,
TV automatically works and a person watches TV in Alferes et al.’s approach,
while this is not the case in our semantics. This difference comes from the fact
that (Alferes et al., 2000) considers that every rule/fact in the initial program P1
persistently holds unless it is forced to be false by updates. Besides, persistent
sentences once rejected by an update revive when the update is later invalidated.
12 (Alferes et al., 2000) uses default negation not instead of explicit negation ¬ in the head of
rules.
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However, such a persistent assumption works too strong in many situations.13 For
instance, consider the following scenario. “A person planned to go to a concert on
this Friday’s evening and reserved a seat. After a while, however, a meeting was
scheduled with his client on that day, so he canceled the reservation. On Friday
morning, there is a call from the client that she will be absent from the meeting
because of illness.” The situation is described as follows. The initial situation is
Q1 : seat reserved← .
Updating Q1 with
Q2 : ¬seat reserved← cancel reservation,
cancel reservation← meeting scheduled,
meeting scheduled←
amounts to the new program Q2. Next, updating Q2 with
Q3 : ¬meeting scheduled← meeting canceled,
meeting canceled← client absent,
client absent←,
results in the program (Q2 ∪Q3) \ {meeting scheduled←}, which has the answer
set { client absent, meeting canceled, ¬meeting scheduled }. On the other hand,
according to (Alferes et al., 2000), the fact in Q1 revives after updating Q2 with
Q3. As a result, it automatically recovers cancelled reservation after the client’s
call, which is unintuitive. In real life, once a state has changed by an update, the
state is not always recovered again just by cancelling the effect of an update. A
knowledge base generally contains persistent knowledge and temporary knowledge,
and it is important to distinguish them. Back to the TV example, if tv on holds by
default whenever the power is supplied, it is represented as a default rule
tv on← not power failure .
In this case, we have the same result as (Alferes et al., 2000) after updates.
Alferes et al. (2002) propose a language called LUPS for specifying changes to
logic programs. It realizes a theory update by a series of update commands which
are translated into a normal logic program written in a meta-language under the
stable model semantics. Using LUPS, persistent/non-persistent rules are distin-
guished by the commands always/assert, which are respectively cancelled by
cancel/retract. For instance, the situation in the above example is expressed
as
assert seat reserved.
retract seat reserved whenmeeting scheduled.
Then, reservation is cancelled when meeting is scheduled, and the reservation is
13 They call it the “principle of inertia” but the assumption is stronger than the law of inertia in
the usual sense.
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never recovered just by cancelling the meeting. Compared with their approach, up-
date programs considered in this paper specify changes at the object level. Moreover,
our update programs are used for computing not only theory updates but also view
updates.
Eiter et al. (2000) reformulate the approach of (Alferes et al., 2000) and introduce
update programs which have the same effect as dynamic logic programs. They also
introduce minimal and strict updates in an update sequence. For instance, consider
the program sequence:
P1 : a←,
P2 : ¬a← not c,
P3 : c← not d, d← not c.
First, updating P1 by P2 has the single answer set {¬a} as the solution. Next,
updating P2 by P3 has two answer sets S1 = {c} and S2 = {¬a, d}. Among these
two, S1 is consistent with P1 ∪ P2, while S2 is inconsistent with P1 then P1 is
rejected. In this case, S1 is called minimal with respect to historical changes, and
is preferred to S2. A strict update further takes the temporal order of updates into
consideration. Our theory updates just consider the minimal change between the
current knowledge base and the new one, and do not take the history of updates
into consideration. In the above example, our theory updates produce the program
P2 ∪ P3 and both S1 and S2 are the solutions. However, the selection of minimal
updates with respect to historical changes is not always intuitive. For instance,
consider the scenario: First, a person planned to join a party as she had no schedule
on that day (P1). After a while, she got a job which must be done by that day. If
she is not free due to the job, she cannot join the party (P2). Now, the party is
tomorrow. But she does not know whether she can finish the job before the party
(P3). The scenario is represented by the program sequence:
P1 : join party ←,
P2 : ¬join party ← not free,
P3 : free← not busy,
busy ← not free,
which have the same structure as the preceding example. In this case, there seems
no reason to prefer { join party, free } to {¬join party, busy }, since according
to the latest information P3 it is not known whether free or busy. Eiter et al.’s
approach is based on the causal rejection principle which states that an old rule r
is discarded by a more recent rule r′ only if r contradicts r′. The causal rejection
principle resolves contradiction between old and new programs, but does not resolve
contradiction which arises in a program. For instance, updating the program P1 =
{ q ←, ¬q ← a } with P2 = { a ←} has no solution by the causal rejection
principle, while we have solutions by removing one of the two rules in P1.
Buccafurri et al. (1999) introduce an inheritance program which consists of a
set of EDPs ordered by a generality relation. It realizes default reasoning in in-
heritance hierarchies and is also applied to updating logic programs. A
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to (Eiter et al., 2000), inheritance programs are equivalent to update programs of
Eiter et al.’s, hence the same arguments as the comparison with update programs
are applied.
Zhang and Foo (1998) study theory updates between ELPs. When updating P1
with P2, they first update each answer set S of P1 with P2. The result of this
update, S′, is a set of ground literals which has minimal difference from S and
satisfies each rule in P2. Next, a maximal subset P
′ ⊆ P1 is extracted such that
S′ is a subset of an answer set of P ′ ∪ P2. When there is a conflict between rules
in P ′ and P2, a higher priority is put on rules in P2 and those rules are selected
in the resulting program. Our theory update is different from theirs in both the
method and the result. First, their update consists of a series of transactions: com-
putation of the answer sets of the original program, updates on these answer sets,
extraction of rules from the original program, merging two programs, and conflict
resolution based on preference. By contrast, we perform a theory update in a much
simpler manner by translating a program into an update program and computing
the U-minimal answer sets of the update program. Second, conflict resolution taken
in their approach often has an effect which seems too strong. As pointed out by
(Eiter et al., 2000), updating P1 = { p ← not q } with P2 = { q ← not p } results
in P2, even though P1 ∪ P2 is consistent. In our framework, the result of update is
P1 ∪ P2.
Decker (1997) provides an abductive procedure for computing both user up-
dates and schema updates in normal logic programs. User updates corresponds to
view updates, while schema updates consider updating a theory with a rule. The
procedure is top-down and works correctly for locally stratified programs. Studies
(Boutilier and Becher, 1995; Boutilier, 1996; Lobo and Uzca´tegui, 1996) character-
ize belief update/revision based on normal abduction in monotonic propositional
theories. These approaches are the so-called “interpretation updates” and compute
updates in terms of individual models of a theory. This is in contrast to our theory
updates which computes updates directly by a program.
To resolve inconsistency in a nonmonotonic logic program, Pereira et al. (1991)
introduce a method of contradiction removal in extended logic programs. When con-
flicting conclusions are brought by a program, they prefer a conclusion that does
not depend on any default assumption. This method does not resolve inconsistency
in a program of Example 5.4, where contradiction is brought by no default assump-
tion. (Dama´sio and Pereira, 1995) uses abduction to resolve inconsistency in ELPs.
When a program derives contradiction, it is resolved by changing the truth value of
abducible literals from true to false or undefined under the well-founded semantics.
Yuan and You (1998) formalize the same problem by a three-valued semantics and
resolve inconsistency in ELPs using a suitable program transformation. In their
approach, the revised programs contain newly introduced literals. These studies
use three-valued semantics and have different handling of inconsistency in general.
For instance, the rule p ← not p makes a program inconsistent under the answer
set semantics, while p is interpreted undefined under the well-founded semantics.
Syntactically, the above studies do not handle programs containing disjunctions.
Witteveen and van der Hoek (1997) consider a back-up semantics when the in-
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tended semantics fails to provide a consistent meaning to a program. For instance,
when a program is inconsistent under the stable model semantics, they consider the
minimal model semantics as a back-up semantics. Then, the program is made consis-
tent by introducing some sentences which are supported by the back-up semantics.
In this approach two different semantics are considered on the same program and
the result of revision depends on the choice of a back-up semantics. Moreover, it
does not resolve contradiction in the type of program of Example 5.4.
Inoue (1994) characterizes inconsistency resolution in an ELP P by the abductive
program 〈 ∅, P 〉. Then, he considers a maximal consistent subset of the hypotheses
P , which is computed using a program transformation from the abductive program
to an ELP. We characterized the same problem by the abductive program 〈P, P 〉
in Section 5.3, but the result is the same as (Inoue, 1994) for ELPs. The problem is
also characterized by the abductive program 〈P,LP 〉 in (Inoue and Sakama, 1995).
This formulation, however, produces different results in general. For instance, given
the inconsistent program P = {¬p←, ← not p }, 〈P,LP 〉 has the minimal expla-
nation ({p}, {¬p}) which produces the updated program { p←, ← not p }. On the
other hand, 〈P, P 〉 has the minimal explanation ({}, {← not p}) and the result of
update is {¬p ←}. Thus, 〈P,LP 〉 permits the introduction of new facts as well
as the deletion of facts to resolve inconsistency. Generally, permitting introduction
of sentences increases the number of possible solutions. Nevertheless, this type of
inconsistency resolution is also realized by computing consistent U-minimal answer
sets of the update program of 〈P,LP 〉.
7.4 Belief revision
Update is often distinguished from (belief) revision (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991).
That is, update targets the problem of changing one’s belief up to date when the
(external) world changes. By contrast, revision handles the problem of modifying
one’s belief when new information about the static world is obtained (while the
external world does not change). In this paper we handled the problem of view up-
dates and theory updates, both of which are caused by the change of the external
world in general. A question is then whether the present approach is also applicable
to revision. Our position on this point is as follows. It is true that the distinction
between update and revision is useful in some contexts, however, we do not consider
that such a distinction is always possible. For instance, recall the bird-fly example
in Section 1.2:
flies(x)← bird(x), not ab(x),
ab(x)← broken-wing(x),
bird(tweety)←,
broken-wing(tweety)← .
When we observe that tweety flies, the program is updated by deleting the fact
broken-wing(tweety), for instance. Is this belief change is update or revision? On
one hand, it is considered that the external world has changed – tweety has healed;
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on the other hand, it is considered that the external world never changes, but the
reasoner has a wrong (initial) belief – broken-wing(tweety).
As this example indicates, the same problem is captured from different view-
points. Only by observing new evidence, one cannot judge in general whether it
comes from the change of the (external) world or not. Moreover, some researchers ar-
gue that revision is viewed as update of mental states (del Val and Shoham, 1994).
In this sense, we do not strictly distinguish update and revision in this paper.
Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991) distinguish update and revision in the context
of propositional theories, and introduce postulates to distinguish them. We do not
examine these postulates in our update framework, but those postulates are defined
for monotonic propositional theories and, as argued in (Eiter et al., 2000), they are
not applicable to nonmonotonic updates in general. Katsuno and Mendelzon also
argue that inconsistency in a knowledge base is resolved by revision rather than
update. However, we often have inconsistent information in daily life, and resolve
inconsistency by acquiring more accurate information. This process is captured as
an update of one’s mental state. Inconsistency removal considered in this paper is
an example of this type of updates.
8 Conclusion
This paper introduced an abductive framework for computing various update prob-
lems in nonmonotonic logic programs. The first contribution of this paper is a com-
putational method for extended abduction through update programs. Update pro-
grams are extended disjunctive programs which are obtained by a simple program
transformation from abductive programs. Then, (minimal) credulous/skeptical (anti-
)explanations of positive/negative observations are computed by the (U-minimal)
answer sets of an update program. The second contribution of this paper is charac-
terizations of view updates and theory updates in terms of extended abduction. Ex-
tended abduction is suitable for formalizing information changes in nonmonotonic
theories, and different types of updates are computed by the U-minimal answer sets
of update programs in a uniform manner. Using update programs, computation of
updates is realized on top of the existing procedures for answer set programming
with the additional mechanism of selecting U-minimal answer sets.
It has been widely recognized that abduction plays an important role in updating
data and knowledge bases. The advantage of the present paper lies in its capability
of uniform treatment of different types of theory changes as well as in its syntactic
generality of the language. Formalizing various update problems in a single frame-
work clarifies the difference of each update, and implies the possibility of integrating
them. For instance, integrity maintenance and inconsistency removal are captured
as special cases of view updates and theory updates, respectively. Then, consistency
restoration is done as a sub-task of the corresponding update procedure. Further,
it is possible to execute view updates and theory updates in a combined manner.
For instance, suppose a knowledge base K which consists of the invariable part K1
and the variable part K2. Then, an update on K1 is done by view updates and an
update on K2 is done by theory updates. View updates and theory updates have
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been respectively studied in the field of databases and AI, but their combinations
are not exploited in the literature due to different formulations. Thanks to the uni-
form treatment of this paper, we could provide a theoretical basis for such mixed
types of updates.
There is a trade-off between syntactic generality of the framework and the effi-
ciency of the computational mechanism. Our abductive/update framework is gen-
eral in the sense that it is applicable to any extended disjunctive program, while
its computation is inefficient as it requires computing every answer set of an up-
date program. As discussed in Section 7.1, goal-driven abduction does not produce
correct answers in unstratified programs under the answer set semantics. On the
other hand, the framework of extended abduction is independent of a particular
semantics, so that abductive updates considered in this paper could be formulated
under different semantics which has a correct top-down procedure. From the com-
plexity viewpoints, general update problems have very high complexity and are
intractable in general (unless P = NP ). Further, the update program UP uses
unstratified negation in abd(·), so that it is not evaluated efficiently even when the
objective program P is a stratified (normal) program. (When a program P is a dis-
junctive program, replacing abd(a) with the disjunctive fact a; a does not introduce
unstratified negation to UP as presented in Section 3.1.) One solution to avoid
using unstratified negation is provided by (Inoue, 2000) which introduces a simple
translation from extended abduction to normal abduction. (The idea of this transla-
tion is presented in Section 6.) This translation keeps minimal (anti-)explanations,
while it preserves the stratified structure of programs. An alternative formalization
of update problems based on this transformation is left for future study.
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